65288a64fe These three issues are not un-related. In both editions of the Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen toys with the idea that perhaps changes in the basic norms of municipal legal systems legally derive from the basic norm of public international law. As mentioned above, in Chapter Four of his book, Kelsen distinguished the static theory of law from the dynamic theory of law (see discussion below). General Theory of Law and State (German original not published; Wedberg trans.), 1945, New York 1961, Clark (N.J.) 2007. For Kelsen as for other central European contemporaries, norms occur not singly but in sets, termed 'orders'. A law enacted by the California legislature only applies within the boundaries of the state of California, and it applies during a certain period of time, after its enactment and until a time when it is modified or repealed. There are no free-floating legal norms. Secondary Sources Green, S.M., 2016, “Marmor’s Kelsen”, in D.A. “A ‘Justified Normativity’ Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz”.
Does this mean that, by a strange coincidence, all of them are victims of an epistemological schizophrenia, being non-normative on the one hand and normative on the other? Or that there is, after all, some possible connection between legal theory and political theory? There are several ways in which one could answer the latter question in the affirmative. For Kelsen, the assessment of international law is that it represents a very primitive form of law in distinct contrast to the highly developed forms of law as may be found in individual nations and states. The normative structure of religion is very similar to that of law. Importantly, Kelsen allows for the legislative process to recognize the law as the product of political and ethical debate which is the product of the activity of the legislature before it becomes part of the domain of the static theory of law. However, most if not all jurists now accept H. Thus, to get an “ought” type of conclusion from a set of “is” premises, one must point to some “ought” premise in the background, an “ought” that confers the normative meaning on the relevant type of “is”. Be this as it may, even if Kelsen erred about the details of the unity of legal systems, his main insight remains true, and quite important. Kelsen’s view of morality was relativist all the way down. So here is what emerges so far: the concept of normativity, the sense in which normative content is related to reasons for action, is the same across all normative domains. For Kelsen, 'is' and 'ought' occupy separate worlds as a matter of logic, but not in practice.